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Abstract 
This paper considers the differential effects of industry-level Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) on plant-level employment and wages of skilled and unskilled 
workers of India’s manu- facturing sector, based on the size of the plant. I find that 
there are strong positive differential effects to big plants in terms of employment 
and average wages of both skilled and unskilled workers relative to average sized 
and small plants with increased industry-level inward FDI. Further, this relative 
increase in employment of production workers at big plants is biased to- wards 
male workers. Average sized and smaller plants experience negative effects of 
inward FDI which can be explained in terms of intra-industry reallocation of output 
from smaller to bigger plants and poaching of higher quality production and skilled 
workers by bigger plants as industry-level FDI increases. However, in a more 
detailed analysis, I find that in regions where FDI inflows are large and persistent, 
there are strong positive effects in terms of increases in skill composition and 
wage-skill premium to both big and small plants alike. This suggests that for plants 
to experience positive effects of industry-level FDI, a critical mass of inward FDI 
needs to be achieved. The findings are important especially in the context of 
India’s recent Make-in-India campaign which combined with the objectives of the 
National Manufacturing Policy and the National Skill Development Corporation 
strives to increase India’s productive capacity in order to generate positive 
employment effects, and especially increase the pool of skilled workers in India’s 
manufacturing sector. 
 
  
*I am grateful to Aradhna Aggarwal, two anonymous referees, participants of 
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1 Introduction 
 
Economic theory and policy has often stressed on the important role of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in terms of transforming the productive capacities of an 
economy as well as contributing to development of human capital. It is posited 
that increased globalization in inward FDI has greater beneficial effects than 
tariff liberalization because of the scope of a greater transfer of technol- ogy 
and skills to the domestic economy than imports or trade. Most highlighted are 
the effects of spillovers to other domestic players in the industry. While most 
studies have focused heavily on what factors attract FDI, and under what 
conditions does one observe the spillover effects, the impact of such FDI on 
employment and wages of workers is less extensive, especially in the devel- 
oping country context and more specifically, for South Asia. 
Most developing countries’ policies have been aimed at trying to encourage 
more inward FDI in keeping with their growth and development objectives. India 
has moved to a more liberalized FDI regime over the past few years which 
includes allowing FDI to enter through the automatic route in most cases, and 
raising FDI cap for many sectors. More recently, India launched its Make-in-India 
campaign, which aims towards attracting more investment in India but with a 
special thrust towards improving domestic production capabilities. 
While Indian policy has been successful in attracting FDI — according to 
UNCTAD it was 
$34 billion in 2014
1 making it one of the global top ten countries in terms of FDI 
inflows — little is known about how this is affecting workers in terms of wages 
and employment. An important goal of the Make in India campaign that is 
aligned with India’s National Manufacturing Policy, is to increase the level of 
employment in manufacturing. Moreover, the National Skill Development 
                                                          
1 UNCTAD World Investment Report (2015) Reforming International Investment Governance, United Nations Pub- 
lication., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2015 
 
Corporation has been set up, to provide skills to India’s labour force 
acknowledging the fact that the development of an economy is contingent on the 
growth and development of its human capital. Most studies on FDI in India are 
focused on the determinants of inward FDI in India and are either industry-level 
studies or case studies. While the former does not take into account important 
within- industry plant heterogeneity while estimating the effects of FDI, the latter 
may be informative but not statistically robust or generalizable. 
This paper focuses on the effects of industry-level FDI on plant-level 
employment and wages of both skilled and unskilled workers in India’s 
manufacturing sector. It investigates whether FDI increases plant-level 
employment and average wages, but more importantly, whether the change in 
demand for workers due to increased FDI inflows is skill biased or not. According 
to traditional theory, foreign ownership provides host country with access to 
knowledge, which if absorbed by domestic workers enhances domestic human 
capital stock making it permanently more productive. This spills over to domestic 
firms through training of suppliers, imitation, and labour mobility — wherein 
workers migrate from multinational firms to domestic firms and through various 
channels of formal and informal interaction transfer their know-how to domestic 
workers (Aitken and Harrison (1999), Poole (2013)). An increase in quality of 
workers should lead to an increase in average wages of workers both in 
domestic and foreign firms. Further, if there are complementarities be- tween 
foreign inputs accompanied with foreign investment and the skills of workers, 
increase in FDI should also lead to an increase in demand for skilled workers, 
and increase the skill composi- tion at foreign plants while putting an upward 
pressure on the wage-skill premium. Spillovers to domestic plants however, 
might not occur if inflows of FDI are small and not persistent enough to transform 
the workforce at FDI firms, or create a large enough supply of skilled workers 
who can then migrate to smaller, domestic firms. In such a case, we would see a 
greater poaching of skilled workers in the domestic industry by foreign firms as 
opposed to an increase in the supply of skilled workers. 
The paper estimates the above relationship by using plant-level data available 
from Annual Sur- vey of Industries by the Ministry of Commerce, India, and 
industry-level FDI data from the Depart- ment of Industrial Policy and Promotion, 
Ministry of Finance, India for the years 2000-2006. The main finding is that with 
increased inflows of industry-level FDI, bigger plants experience a greater 
increase in employment of, and average wages paid out to both skilled and 
unskilled workers, rela- tive to average sized and smaller plants in the industry. 
The effects are negative for smaller plants as far as employment of production 
workers is concerned, which suggests that there are greater mar- ket reallocation 
effects away from smaller plants with increased industry-level FDI, causing them 
to reduce production and employment. Moreover, there are negative effects for 
average sized and smaller plants even in terms of average wages paid out to 
skilled and unskilled workers, suggesting that there is poaching of higher quality 
production and skilled workers by big plants as industry- level FDI increases. I 
also find that the differential increase in employment of production workers at 
bigger plants is biased towards male workers as industry-level FDI increases. 
When considering the differential impact on regions, however, I find that states 
that are the biggest winners in terms of FDI inflow — both in terms of quantity 
and persistence of flows, experience strong spillover effects in terms of the 
wage-skill premium and skill composition, i.e. big and small plants alike 
experience an increase in the relative wages as industry-level FDI increases as 
well a higher com- position of skilled workers. This could point towards the fact 
that it is likely, that for an industry to experience positive horizontal spillovers in 
wages, a critical mass of FDI should be reached and the inflow should persist 
over a period of time. Only then do we observe greater training, mobility and 
imitation that contributes to a higher pool of skilled workers in the industry, such 
that plants can benefit from this increased supply and experience an increase in 
the skill composition of the workforce. For instance, Poole (2013) highlights that 
higher skilled former multinational workers are better able to transfer the 
multinational’s technology while higher-skilled incumbent workers are better able 
to absorb the transferred technology. Based on this mode, we can expect 
workers at multinationals to experience an increase in their skills only after a 
certain period of working and training, and further, incumbents to increase their 
level of skills only when there is a substantial share of multinational workers at 
their firms. Morevoer, regions with high FDI might even have better backward 
and forward linkages, allowing FDI to flow over a sustained period of time. 
This paper is divided into 9 sections.  Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
impact of FDI on employment and wages and the evidence of spillovers, and 
places this paper in the context of the current literature. Section 3 specifically 
focuses on FDI studies in India, which are mainly focused on the factors that 
influence inward FDI. Important lessons drawn from these studies will be 
incorporated into the empirical analyses of this paper. The empirical model is 
discussed in Section 4. A description of the data and measurement of the 
variables used in the empirical model can be found in Section 5. Section 6 
discusses the estimation results, while robustness checks across various 
specifications are presented in Section 7. Section 8 considers the differential 
impact of FDI on the outcome variables across regions and Section 9 concludes. 
 
 
2 Related Literature and Motivation 
 
In the literature investigating the impacts of FDI, there has been a recent shift 
towards plant-level analyses as opposed to industry-level or sector-level analyses. 
Post Melitz (2003), studies now take into account heterogeneity within industries 
across plants and firms, which are crucial to under- standing the effects of FDI. 
Earlier studies investigating the role of FDI on labour focused mainly on the 
impact of FDI on labour productivity and whether there were any spillover effects to 
domestic plants. Blomstrom and Persson (1983) find that an increase in foreign 
share in an industry is corre- lated with an increase in labour productivity at even 
domestically owned plants in the industry. This however, is a cross-sectional 
industry-level study and suffers from a crucial identification problem that it can’t 
control for fixed differences in productivity across industries, which may be a 
source of endogeneity bias. Controlling for these industry-level fixed effects for 
a study in Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison (1999) distinguish between the “own 
plant” effect and spillover effect of FDI by considering both plant-level FDI and 
industry-level FDI, while controlling for industry-level fixed effects. While Aitken 
and Harrison (1999) focus on productivity as an outcome of interest, I will follow a 
similar methodology but apply it to understand the effects on levels of 
employment, skill composition and wages. They find that while there is a positive 
effect of own plant FDI on productivity, the spillover effects to domestic plants 
are negative, owing mainly to the market re- allocation effect. I expect to find 
similar effects of industry-level employment of small plants, that are unlikely to 
receive inward FDI and unable to stay competitive with increased foreign 
presence in their industry. 
There are various other studies that estimate the effect of FDI on productivity 
and wages for developed and developing countries. Feenstra and Hanson 
(1995) find during the relaxation of the FDI regime in Mexico, the offshoring of 
jobs that were relatively unskilled labour intensive in the US but relatively skill 
intensive in Mexico, explained nearly 50 per cent of the increase in relative 
wages during the early 1980s in Mexico. This effect was largely driven by the 
changes because of FDI at maquiladoras, the export processing zones. The other 
strand of literature pertains to identifying spillovers. While positive spillovers of 
FDI are found for the US, both in terms of gains in total factor productivity (Keller 
and Yeaple (2009)) and wages (Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey (1995)), these are 
found to be absent for developing countries such as Mexico and Venezuela (Aitken 
et al. (1995)). While my study also finds negative spillovers for smaller plants in 
India, in a regional analysis, I find that regions receiving large and persistent FDI 
inflows actually experience positive spillovers. It is possible that high FDI regions 
in India mimic a developed country environment, where FDI (presumably in the 
presence of strong backward and forward linkages) has been able to transform 
domestic capability over time, resulting in increased spillovers. 
More recently, a paper that provides evidence of positive spillovers of FDI in 
Brazil is by Poole (2013). Using matched employer-employee data, the paper 
shows that as workers migrate from multinational to domestic firms, there is an 
increase in the wages of even domestic workers at in- cumbent firms. Further, 
the transfer of technology is greater the higher the skills of the worker migrating 
from the multinational and the higher the skill of the worker at the incumbent firm. 
Av- erage wages for incumbent workers at the domestic firm increase as the 
share of workers from multinationals increase at the domestic firm. Using my 
regional analysis, I am able to show similar effects for small firms in high FDI 
receiving regions. Using the mechanism described in Poole (2013), it is likely 
that there is a bigger pool of skilled workers in regions that have experienced a 
sustained, large inflow of FDI, that even small firms are able to benefit from these 
workers. 
The literature on the impact of trade liberalization and offshoring provides some 
insight into the relationship between inputs that embody foreign technology and 
the skills of plant-level workers. For Indonesia, it has been found that increased 
importing behavior leads to higher average wages paid out to workers through 
increased profit sharing by firms that experience productivity benefits through 
these technologically sophisticated imports (Amiti and Davis (2012)). However, 
while increasing average wages in Indonesia, these imports reduced the relative 
wage, a posited reason being that imported inputs substituted away skilled 
workers at plants that were producing the inputs in-house. On the contrary, in the 
case of Hungary, Csillag and Koren (2011) find that imported machines 
embodying superior technology are complementary to skills of workers, leading to 
both an increase in skill composition and skill premium at importing plants. If 
inward FDI leads to a decline in average wages and employment of skilled 
workers in India, I can expect to derive an explanation in terms of in-house 
substitution of inputs and workers. However, if I observe an increase in skill 
composition and wage-skill premium, I can conclude that there are 
complementarities between foreign investment (embodying superior technology) 
and the skills of workers. If the latter is the case, developing countries can rely 
on FDI to create a skill-biased demand for workers in their countries. 
This paper significantly derives motivation from Das (2002) who theoretically 
models the ef- fects of FDI on relative wages in developing countries. Under 
certain conditions in his model, FDI might actually decrease relative wage. One 
possible channel is a decline in demand for skilled work- ers as there is intra-
industry substitution of output from the less efficient domestic firms to the more 
efficient (by assumption) foreign firms. The second is through influencing 
occupational choices of skilled workers and crowding them out from 
entrepreneurial jobs to equally skilled for-wage positions at multinationals. This 
paper empirically finds that there is an intra-industry substitution of labour from 
the smaller to the larger plants as the industry-level FDI increases.  Based on   
the assumption that size may be a proxy for efficiency and likelihood of receiving 
FDI, I believe that this result corroborates what Das (2002) predicts will happen 
in case there is a technological gap. If there is an intra-industry substitution of 
output from smaller plants to bigger plants, we must also expect an intra-
industry substitution of labour, with employment declining at smaller plants and 
increasing in bigger plants. While Das (2002) makes a prediction about what 
would happen to the relative wage on average, this paper considers differential 
effects on average wages of both skilled and unskilled workers. The main finding 
is that while average wages of both skilled and unskilled workers increase 
differentially for bigger plants, smaller plants actually experience a de- cline. 
Assuming that the technology gap between foreign plants and domestic plants still 
exist, this result is in line with the expectation of the model. In fact, in states that 
are (historically) the largest recipients of FDI, this differential is likely to be 
smaller, and I find that there are actually positive spillovers to both small and 
large plants alike. 
 
 
3 Inward FDI in India 
 
Most of the literature on FDI for India thus far has been focused on the 
determinants of FDI inflows, however there are few studies that focus on the 
impact of FDI on various industry-level or firm- level outcomes. FDI has been 
increasing in India post liberalization and India is now one of the major recipients 
of FDI among the emerging economies (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (2015)). These changes in FDI have been a response to continually 
liberalized policy as well as changes in state-level policies that have increased 
the ease of doing business and made it more attractive for foreign investors to 
invest in India. 
In a study that investigates the role of state-level policies that affect inward 
Foreign Direct In- vestment, Banga (2003), finds that there is a differential effect 
of state-level policies on the source of FDI. While removal of restrictions 
increases FDI from developed countries to developing coun- tries, fiscal 
incentives are more effective for attracting FDI from developing countries. In 
addition, Bilateral Investment Treaties play an important role in attracting FDI from 
developed to developing countries. Aggarwal (2005) further investigates the role 
of labour market institutions in attracting FDI. She distinguishes between 
domestic-market seeking and export oriented FDI, and finds that while rigid 
labour market institutions discourage both kinds of FDI, the effect is more 
pronounced on domestic market seeking FDI. Mukherjee (2011) shows that FDI 
in India is highly regionally concentrated and examines the state level factors that 
play an important role. Market size, agglom- eration effects and size of 
manufacturing and services base in a state have a positive and significant effect 
on FDI inflows. On the other hand, she finds that taxation policies and labour 
costs have a significant negative impact on FDI inflows. Morris (2004) echoes the 
findings that FDI is strongly regionally concentrated and further examines the 
determinants of FDI inflows specifically for Gu- jarat. 
These studies highlight the regional concentration of FDI and the 
importance of state-level policies that affect taxes, infrastructure and labour 
market institutions which are instrumental   in determining the level of FDI 
inflows. In keeping with these findings, I will control for these effects while 
empirically estimating the relationship between industry-level FDI and plant-level 
outcomes. Further, I will also investigate how the estimated relationship varies 
for each region. I will divide the states into three regions — those receiving the 
highest FDI inflows, followed by those receiving medium inflows and finally the 
region with the lowest inflows. 
 
 
4 Empirical Estimation 
 
In the estimation exercise, I want to distinguish between the effects of industry-
level inward FDI on employment and wages for big and average-sized or small 
plants. For the baseline specification, I will use Total Sales by the plant as a 
measure for size. Data on whether a plant is the recipient of FDI or not is not 
available in the ASI data. However, there are certain benefits of not using plant- 
level FDI for the estimations. Plant level FDI will generate various endogeneity 
bias concerns, when studying its impact on plant-level variables. Using industry 
level FDI and a proxy — size, for whether a plant receives FDI help overcome 
these concerns to better understand the effect of FDI on the variables of interest. 
In Section 5, I discuss why size is a reasonable proxy for plant-level FDI. The proxy 
also helps distinguish between those plants that are better able to adjust to 
increase in competition from those that cannot. Further, in Section 5, using 
Prowess data I will also show that it is not the case that there are a few focal 
firms in an industry receiving all the FDI to further alleviate concerns regarding 
endogeneity. I use the following specification for my estimation: 
 
 
ln yit =   αi + αrt + αj + β1 ∗ ln FDIjt + β2 ∗ ln FDIjt ∗ ln sizeit + 
β3 ∗ ln sizeit + β4 ∗ ln Xit + ϵit (1) 
 
The various outcomes of interest are at the plant level and these are: total 
employment, employ- ment of skilled workers (further, we will consider two sub-
categories — employment of managerial and supervisory staff and other skilled 
employees), employment of production (unskilled) workers, skill composition, total 
wages, total average wages, and relative wages. Consider the impact of an 
increase in industry-level FDI. Given that bigger firms are likely to be the recipients 
of this FDI, and probably direct beneficiaries of the technology transfer from such 
FDI, we can expect an increase in production activity, which further has a 
positive impact on total employment of workers. Fur- ther, given the technology 
transfer, and complementarities between superior technology and quality (proxied 
by skill of workers), we can assume that bigger firms will also experience an 
increase in relative demand for skilled workers. Therefore for all the outcome 
variables, we should expect β2 > 0. Even in cases where size does not act as a 
proxy for presence of foreign equity and tech- nology in a plant, we can expect 
the biggest plants to compete most aggressively to the increase in FDI in the 
industry by upgrading their own technology and skill of workers (even increasing 
wages to retain workers), such that β2  > 0. β1, in this specification, captures the 
spillover effects. It captures the impact of FDI on all the small plants in the 
industry. If spread of technological know-how due to presence of foreign 
investors leads to an increase in economic activity industry-wide, and if this 
know-how is transferred to workers on a persistent basis leading to an increase 
in skill of the workforce in general, we should expect β1  >  0 for all outcome 
variables as well.  However, if there is a greater market contraction effect on 
smaller domestic firms, and there is no transfer of technology, but rather a 
poaching of skilled workers from domestic plants to bigger plants with FDI, we 
should expect β1  < 0 for the outcome variables. 
There is a concern that perhaps for regions receiving high FDI, even smaller 
plants are recipients of inward FDI, so a positive β1 does not capture spillovers 
but the effects of plant-level FDI. In Section 5, I show that even in high FDI 
regions, it is plants that are sized much higher than the average or median that 
receive FDI, and it not the case that FDI is more evenly distributed across size. 
So even in these regions, β1 continues to capture spillover effects. 
In order to control for within-industry plant heterogeneity, the estimation controls 
for plant fixed effects. This will control for any unobservable characteristics that 
may cause a plant to select into engaging in FDI, which may further influence the 
relationship I’m estimating. Further, as stressed by Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
and Keller and Yeaple (2009), various time-invariant unobservable industry 
characteristics may cause higher FDI to flow into certain industries than others. 
To make sure these do not affect my estimation, I also control for industry fixed 
effects. Finally, while year fixed effects would control for any economy-wide 
policy that affects all plants equally, from Mukherjee (2011), Aggarwal (2005), 
Banga (2003) and Morris (2004), we know that there are important regional 
variations in the distribution of FDI and that state policy plays a crucial role in 
attracting FDI. The estimation therefore controls for state-year fixed effects, which 
control for any unobservable (in the data) changes that were made at the state-
level, which would affect inward FDI and the outcome variable. The standard 
errors in the estimation are robust, and have been clustered at the industry-year 
level. 
 
 
5 Data and Measurement 
 
The main dataset used to measure the variables in the above specification is the 
plant-level data from the Annual Survey of Industries released by the Ministry of 
Commerce, India. The survey is the most comprehensive dataset of India’s 
manufacturing sector available, and has recently been made available as a 
panel. This dataset is better suited to this project than the other commonly used 
Prowess dataset because it contains detailed information on employment and 
wages of production and skilled workers that the latter is unable to provide. The 
data is very detailed and provides information on various plant characteristics 
such as fixed assets, working capital, total sales, em- ployment and wages for all 
categories of workers and employees, five digit NIC industry and state of location. 
For this study, I have used a strongly balanced panel of 5, 425 plants. Outcome 
vari- ables of interest have been used or calculated from the dataset. For 
instance, skill composition has been calculated as a ratio of skilled employees 
(measured as supervisory and managerial staff as well as other professionals 
such as engineers, accountants, designers etc.) to total workers, and relative 
average wages have been calculated by taking a ratio of the average wages paid 
out to a skilled employee to the average wages paid out to a production worker. 
The estimations use natural logs of all variables except skill composition (which is 
a ratio), and summary statistics for these variables are reported in Table 1 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Log(Fixed Capital) 18.96 (1.86) 
Log(Working Capital) 16.32 (2.80) 
Log(Production 
Workers) 
4.87 (1.68) 
Log(Total 
Employment) 
5.13 (1.67) 
Log(Skilled Workers) 3.51 (1.65) 
Log(Male Workers) 4.40 (1.75) 
Log(Female Workers) 3.27 (1.74) 
Log(Managerial 
Workers) 
2.68 (1.61) 
Log(Other Workers) 3.00 (1.58) 
Log(Total Sales) 18.53 (2.50) 
Skill Composition 0.24 (0.16) 
Observations 3687
5 
 
 
In Section 4, I mention that size is used as a proxy for whether plants 
receive FDI or not. The proxy is used because ASI plant-level data does not 
provide information on FDI or foreign ownership. Using data from Prowess, 
which has data on firms that are listed, but includes data on foreign ownership, I 
try to show that firms with FDI are on average much bigger in terms of total 
sales, fixed assets and total wages (as mentioned before, Prowess data does not 
have information on employment). Table 2 shows the size distribution of firms 
receiving FDI from the Prowess dataset in the first column, followed by all firms in 
the Prowess dataset and all plants in the ASI dataset in the second and third 
columns respectively. This is presented for all plants followed by regions 
receiving low, medium and high FDI respectively. It is clear that firms that 
receive FDI have a much higher mean and median than all firms in the Prowess 
dataset and even more so as compared to plants in the ASI dataset. This holds 
for the entire sample as well as when considered for the low FDI, medium FDI 
and high FDI regions. While adding credibility to using size as a proxy for 
receiving FDI (in addition to reflecting a plant’s ability to compete with foreign 
firms), it further allays concerns that in my empirical model, the coefficient on 
industry-level FDI in high regions may not quite capture spillovers, but the effects 
of plant-level FDI in smaller plants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 Figure 1: Distribution of FDI by firm size for industry quartiles 
 
(a) Quartile 1 (b) Quartile 2 
 
 
 
(c) Quartile 3 (d) Quartile 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Further, using Prowess data I also show the distribution of FDI across firm 
size, measured as total sales. This is to show that it is not the case that for our 
data, there are a handful of focal firms receiving FDI which may raise concerns 
regarding endogenity for the use industry-level FDI. Figures 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d 
show the distribution for the four industry quartiles (quartile 1 receiving the lowest 
amount of FDI and quartile 4 receiving the highest). 
The industry-level FDI data used in this study is from the Department of 
Industrial Policy and Promotion by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
Government of India. The report
2 compiles statistics released by the Reserve 
Bank of India for the years 2000-2006. Using the concordance between the DIPP 
sector level codes and the three digit NIC 2004 codes as provided in the 2009 
report, as well as concordance tables for three digit NIC classification from 2004 
to 1998 from the Ministry of Commerce website, inward FDI flows are reported at 
the three digit NIC 1998 level (because industry classification of plants is only 
provided for the NIC 1998 classification in the ASI data). There are a total of 75 
industries considered in the data for the manufacturing sector and there is 
significant variation across industries. 
Section 8 of this paper studies the relationship between industry-level FDI 
and various plant- level employment and wage outcomes for different regions of 
India. Based on the combined FDI and plant-level data, the states have been 
divided into three regions: those that received the highest FDI, moderate FDI and 
lowest FDI. The states included in the region that receives the highest FDI are: 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Haryana, West 
Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. The states included in the second (moderate FDI) 
region are: Madhya Pradesh, Goa, Orissa, Dadar and Nagar Haveli, Rajasthan, 
Delhi, Jharkhand, Uttaranchal and Punjab. The states included in the third (low 
FDI) region are: Pondicherry, Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Bihar, Daman & 
Diu, Chandigarh, Chattisgarh and Jammu & Kashmir. The rest of the states 
receive no FDI and are not included in the analysis in this section. As mentioned 
before, Banga (2003), Aggar- wal (2005) and Mukherjee (2011) provide evidence 
on how FDI inflows are spatially distributed, and Section 8 of this study delves 
into the consequences these regional disparities in FDI inflows have on 
employment and wages of skilled and unskilled workers. 
 
6 Results and Discussion 
 
                                                          
2
 “FDI in India and its Growth linkages.” Sponsored by Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry (National Council Of Applied Economic Research - NCAER (2009)) 
The specification in Section 4 has been estimated for various outcome 
variables. In Table 3, I will first show how alternate specifications, especially in 
terms of various fixed effects, affect the coefficient of interest. The dependent 
variable in Table 3 is total employment at the plant-level. Model 1 only considers 
the levels of FDI, size is proxied by Total Sales, and it also includes various plant-
level controls, which include total fixed capital and working capital. The first 
model only controls for plant fixed effects and year fixed effects. We find that the 
effect of aggregate industry level FDI on plant-level total employment is 
negative, but it’s not statistically or economically significant. 
Model 2 introduces the interaction term between FDI and plant-level Total 
Sales, which is the measure of size being used in this estimation. If we only 
consider the levels of FDI and Total Sales, which are two continuous variables, in 
our interaction term, the coefficient is not very informative. It will give the 
differential effect of FDI on plants that have non-zero Total Sales relative to 
plants that have zero Total Sales. To make this more informative, Total Sales has 
been centered around the mean, so we can compare the effect of FDI on plants 
that are of average size relative to plants that are below average size. We find 
that the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant, which 
means that for plants that are larger than the average plant in the sample, an 
increase in industry-level FDI leads to a bigger increase in total employment 
relative to plants that are smaller than average. These plants are either 
engaging in FDI or large enough to compete with plants benefiting from FDI, and 
are expanding production activity and total employment more than the smaller 
plants in the industry. β1 in this model is negative but insignificant, which can be 
interpreted as a lack of industry-level spillovers in terms of employment, or 
simply smaller plants not gaining from the increased levels of FDI in their industry. 
The coefficient β2 varies from 0.002 to about 0.003. While this may not seem 
economically significant, many industries have seen large percentage increases 
in FDI. Also, this effect will be bigger, the larger the plant is relative to an 
average sized plant. The estimation reveals that a 1000 percentage point 
increase in industry-level FDI, which is what is observed for the top quartile of 
industries that receive FDI from 2003 − 2006, leads to a 2 percentage point 
increase in total employment at the average sized plants. This effect, of course, 
will be bigger, the bigger the size of the plant, and will vary from industry to 
industry and region to region. The variations in industry and region are explored 
in Section 7. 
Model 3 includes industry fixed effects, which control for any fixed differences 
across industries that may lead to a higher inflow of FDI and also affect plant-
level employment. Model 4 includes state fixed effects in addition to industry fixed 
effects, which further controls for any fixed differences across states that may be 
affecting the relationship between inward FDI and plant-level employment. It may 
be possible however; that the differences across industries vary over time and β1 
may pick up these changes that are affecting the dependent variable. In order to 
control for this, Model 5 includes industry-year fixed effects, which allows us to 
estimate only the differential effects across big and small plants of industry level 
FDI changes. Similarly, differences across states do vary across time, especially 
with respect to state-policy and as it has been highlighted by Aggarwal (2005), 
Mukherjee (2011), Banga (2003) and Morris (2004), these play a very important 
role in affecting FDI inflows. Model 6 therefore, controls for state-year fixed 
effects. Model 7 controls for both, industry-year and state-year fixed effects. The 
main coefficient of interest β2, continues to be positive and statistically significant 
across all models, and the magnitude also roughly remains the same, being the 
biggest in model 7, where we include the most controls. Ideally, we would like to 
use specification in Model 7 as the baseline, because it includes both state-year 
and industry-year fixed effects, but because β1 is of interest to us, in order to 
estimate the spillover effects to small plants, we use state-year fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects in all the following estimations. 
The specification used in all models in Table 4 includes firm fixed effects, 
industry fixed effects and state-year fixed effects. The outcome variables all 
pertain to employment of workers, starting with total employment at the plant 
level in Model 1. The effects are not different from those dis- cussed in Table 3, 
wherein we find evidence of a relative increase in total employment in large 
plants, possibly those that benefit from increased industry-level FDI, and no 
evidence of spillovers to small plants. Similar effects are found for employment of 
skilled workers and production work- ers in Models 3 and 4. Both models show 
that big plants differentially employ more skilled workers and production workers 
relative to small plants as industry-level FDI increases. However, Model 3 shows 
evidence of negative spillovers of production workers to small plants. This can be 
interpreted as the market contraction effect for smaller firms in favor of large 
firms due to FDI. As industry- level FDI increases, small plants, which are likely 
not receiving this FDI nor are productive enough to compete with plants with 
foreign presence experience a decline in market share, and there is therefore a 
lower derived demand and employment of production workers. In terms of the 
com- position however, Model 4 shows that there are no differential effects in 
terms of the bias towards skilled workers.  At least compositionally, I find no 
evidence of the complementarities   between skilled workers and sophisticated 
technology that is embodied in FDI either in terms of differential effects or in 
terms of spillovers. Models 5 and 6 analyze how the two sub-categories of 
skilled workers are affected by industry-level FDI — these are managerial and 
supervisory staff, as well other technically skilled employees. The estimations 
reveal that the differential effects are much larger in the case of other technically 
skilled employees as compared to supervisory and managerial staff. This is 
indicative of the fact there are bigger complementarities between technical skills 
and FDI than managerial skills and FDI. Alternatively, it could mean that although 
plants would like to adjust their organizational structures and hire more and 
better managers as FDI increases, but are unable to do so because of systemic 
lags in adjustment or rigidities in organizational structures. This could further be 
exacerbated by the fact that there are supply side constraints as far as hiring 
managers is concerned. 
Table 5 studies the relationship between wages of various worker categories 
and industry-level inward FDI. Model 1 examines how the total wage bill at the 
plant-level changes with industry-level FDI, and I find that not only do bigger 
plants pay out higher wage bills relative to small plants, there are negative 
spillovers to small plants as industry-level FDI increases. The total wage bill, 
however, captures both changes in employment and average wages, and may 
just be a reflection of the employment effects observed in Table 4. Model 2 
therefore, considers the average wages paid out to workers, and the positive 
differential effect for big plants as well as the negative spillover effect to small 
plants still persists. The dependent variables in Models 3 and 4 are the average 
wages paid out to skilled workers and production workers respectively. I find that 
again, bigger plants differentially pay higher average wages to both skilled 
workers and production workers relative to small plants, whereas smaller plants 
experience negative spillovers as industry-level FDI increases. This implies that 
there is no evidence of transfer of technology or skills to workers or upskilling of 
the labour pool, and perhaps plants with foreign ownership try to poach the 
existing high quality managers and production workers by offering higher wages. 
Bigger plants that are either recipients of FDI or are more aggressively able to 
compete with plants with FDI poach these workers to stay competitive in the 
market. There is however, no differential increase in relative wages, or the wage- 
skill premium, pointing to the fact that for the manufacturing sector as a whole, 
there is no evidence of a skill biased increase in demand for workers. Skilled 
employees are further classified into two categories — managerial and 
supervisory staff, and other skilled employees (engineers, accountants etc.) in 
Models 6 and 7 respectively. The differential effects are strong for these 
categories as well, and there are negative spillovers for the average sized plant. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Putting the results from the employment and wage effects together, we find 
that bigger plants experience an expansion in employment of both skilled and 
unskilled workers relative to smaller plants as industry-level FDI increases, 
along with a relative increase in the total wage bill and av- erage wages paid out 
to skilled and unskilled workers. There is no evidence of positive spillovers in 
terms of wages or employment to the average sized and smaller plants. In fact, 
there seems to be negative spillovers to smaller plants as far as wages of skilled 
and unskilled workers are con- cerned, pointing towards the fact that there is 
probably more poaching than training with increased industry-level FDI. Further, 
there are negative spillovers to small plants as far as employment of production 
workers is concerned, likely due to a fall in market share from the market 
reallocation effect of greater industry-level FDI. Also, there seem to be no relative 
adjustments in terms of skill composition at bigger plants as FDI increases, and 
neither is there a relative increase in the demand for skilled workers as reflected 
by the insignificant effects on the wage-skill premium. It is pos- sible however, 
that in order to find stronger effects on spillovers in wage-skill premium or skill 
composition, we should consider lagged effects of FDI. I consider this in 
Section 7, which also serves as a robustness check for the results. It could be the 
case that a critical mass of FDI needs to be achieved before one can start 
observing the spillover effects. This question will be revisited in Section 8, where 
I consider the regional variation in FDI and compare effects across states that are 
the so called winners to the states that receive low FDI inflows. 
In the concluding part of this section, I investigate how the employment and 
wages of male and female production workers is affected by industry-level 
inward FDI. There is differential per- ception about the skill and commitment of 
male and female production workers, as theorized by Yahmed (2012), such that 
employers discriminate against female workers. This discrimination is 
exacerbated as plants globalize and become quality conscious. I find that this 
holds in the context of FDI in India’s manufacturing sector. Table 6 shows that 
with an increase in industry-level FDI bigger plants differentially increase the 
employment and average wages paid out to male workers, while the employment 
of female workers remains unaffected. This leads to a slightly statistically 
significant lower relative wage for women at bigger plants relative to smaller 
plants. 
  
 
 
7 Robustness Checks 
 
This section addresses the various endogeneity concerns that can arise while 
estimating the speci- fication in Section 4. It is an extension of Table 3, wherein I 
address more issues to show that the estimation is robust to various other 
specifications. First, I show that the estimation is robust to different measures of 
size. Model 1 in Table 7 considers Fixed Assets as a measure of size instead of 
Total Sales. The estimation results are not affected by the change in measure of 
size. Another important concern is the endogeneity of FDI inflows. As mentioned 
in Section 4, one can expect FDI to flow into productive industries, which may 
lead to an endogeneity bias in the estimates. A few ways in which we control for 
that in Table 3 is by including industry-fixed effects, and also showing that the 
estimation is robust when industry-year fixed effects are included. 
I further show that the estimation is robust to considering lagged FDI in Model 
2. The differ- ential effect is positive and significant, and in fact of a greater 
magnitude, showing that the effects of FDI only increase over time. Another 
important endogeneity bias that the specification possibly suffers from is the 
possibly reverse causality that may exist between size and the various outcome 
variables. Bigger plants may employ more workers, pay higher wages, as well as 
have a higher skill composition. In Model 3 of Table 7, I use lagged Total Sales 
and find again, that the main result still holds. Model 4 of Table 6 considers 
lagged effects of both FDI and Total Sales, and finds that the results are robust to 
this specification as well. 
 
 
8 Regional Heterogenity 
 
While the estimation exercise so far, has estimated the effect of FDI on plant-
level employment and wages, it is important to understand how these effects 
differ across regions. Banga (2003), Aggarwal (2005), and Mukherjee (2011) 
highlight the regional disparities in FDI in India driven by differences in state-
policy, infrastructure and labour market institutions. Based on ranking of states in 
these studies, and the data from DIPP, I have divided the states into three regions 
(refer to Section 5), the first category that receives the lowest inward FDI, the 
second category that receives moderate FDI and finally, the third category that 
receives the highest FDI. 
I estimate the relationship for each of these regions, and the models now 
contain only plant fixed effects, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. The 
outcome variables considered are total employment, skill composition, and 
relative wage (wage-skill premium). The results are shown in Table 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The estimates reveal that in states that are the lowest recipient of FDI, i.e. 
those belonging to region 1, there are no differential effects of FDI between big 
plants and average sized plants. There are only negative spillovers in terms of 
total employment to small plants owing to market reallocation effects. This 
continues to be the case in region 2. In region 3, however, while there are no 
differential effects of FDI between big and small plants, there are strong spillover 
effects enjoyed by both plants alike. Models 8 and 9 show higher skill 
composition and relative wages paid at the average sized plants as industry-level 
FDI increases. Since these are regions where FDI inflows are large and 
persistent, there is a stronger evidence of spillovers. It is possible that a certain 
critical mass of FDI inflows have to be reached before skilled workers start gaining 
from the technological transfer and transfer of know how from foreign investment. 
Further, the transfer takes place over a period of time, which is why we find 
evidence only in regions that have historically been, and continue to be the big 
“winners” as far FDI inflows are concerned. 
This is further highlighted in Table 9, where three states are considered — 
Maharashtra, a state with a very high level of FDI; Madhya Pradesh, a state that 
received medium FDI inflows based on our data, and finally, Assam, that has a 
very low-level of FDI. One can see that Maharashtra experiences an increase in 
both skill composition as well as relative wages in spillovers to even the average 
sized plants as the industry-level FDI increases, and in fact, there is no 
differential effect of FDI based on size. In Madhya Pradesh, these spillovers are 
present for relative wages, but not for skill composition or total employment. In 
Assam, on the other hand, these spillovers are in fact, absent. 
While these tables help us get an aggregate sense of the relationship 
between FDI and various labour outcomes, I further test for whether one 
observes these when one considers a specific in- dustry. I pick an industry that 
belongs to the highest quartile in terms of inward FDI, and is spread across 
various regions. A good example is Basic Chemicals (NIC 241). Table 10 includes 
4 panels 
— the first shows the result for the entire industry and the next three show the 
results for regions receiving low, medium and high FDI respectively. All panels 
echo the results obtained throughout the paper, that while there is an intra-
industry reallocation of labour from large to small plants, in re- gions with high FDI 
(in this case an industry with high FDI overall), there are positive spillovers to 
smaller plants in terms of higher average wages for their production workers and 
skilled employees, as well as an increase in relative wages for skilled workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I investigate the impact of industry-level FDI on plant-level 
employment and wages for both skilled and unskilled workers. The expectation 
is, that given the nature of FDI, which is traditionally expected to embody 
superior technology with increased inflows, there should be a transfer of 
technology to plants and workers, which further enhances the skill and wages of 
workers. Such a transfer especially through training of workers, and combined 
with labour mobility and imitation between plants in an industry is expected to 
have spillover effects to even those plants that do not engage in FDI, i.e. one can 
expect spillovers of FDI to all plants in an industry. 
My hypothesis is that the effect of industry-level FDI, in terms of spillovers, will 
be differential based on the size of the plant. My empirical analysis, that covers 
5425 plants in India’s manufactur- ing sector, confirms this hypothesis. While 
larger plants experience a differential increase in total employment – which 
includes employment of both skilled and unskilled workers —– as well as 
average wages paid out to both skilled and unskilled workers, relative to average 
sized and smaller plants, the smaller plants experience negative spillovers for 
employment of production workers and average wages paid out to both skilled 
and unskilled workers. This suggests that there are strong market reallocation 
effects, and mainly poaching of higher quality production and skilled workers from 
average sized to small plants as there is increased foreign-ownership of plants in 
an indus- try. Further, increased industry-level FDI is associated with a relative 
increase in demand for male blue-collar workers at bigger plants relative to 
average sized to small plants while the demand for female blue-collar workers 
remains unaffected. While there is evidence of an increase in skilled workers, 
there are no differential compositional changes at big plants, neither is there 
evidence of an increase in relative wage skill premium at bigger plants. While this 
may suggest that increase in industry-level FDI in India is not skill-biased in its 
demand for workers nor does it contribute to an increasing pool of skilled workers, 
a careful analysis at the regional level provides a better picture of the actual 
effects. Analyzing the effects of industry-level FDI on different regions reveals 
that even average to small sized plants in regions that receive the highest FDI 
experience an increase in skill composition of workers as well as the wage skill 
premium. This indicates that perhaps a critical mass of FDI is required in order 
to influence the demand for skilled workers at plants as well as contribute to the 
pool of skilled workers in an industry. 
The above findings are important for understanding the effects of a liberalized 
FDI policy. It is important to understand that if the inflow of FDI into an industry is 
low and not sustained over a period of time, we should expect to observe 
greater intra-industry reallocation of output from domestic firms to multinational 
firms due to FDI, and greater poaching of workers as opposed to a contribution 
towards the transformation of the work force. The current “Make in India” 
campaign should ensure that conditions in the domestic economy are such that it 
not only attracts initial small flows of FDI, but that these persist over a period of 
time to be able to benefit the industry-level workforce. Only then will the 
objectives of the “Make in India” campaign go hand in hand with those of other 
initiatives such as the National Skill Development Corporation, which aims to 
upskill India’s workforce, instead of proving to be counterproductive. 
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